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A Return to ‘Civilisational Geopolitics’ in the 
Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical 
Images of the European Union and Turkey in 
the Post-Cold War Era 
PINAR BILGIN 
The prevalence of the discourse of ideological geopolitics during the Cold War meant
that both Turkey and the EU belonged to the West by virtue of their ideological
orientation. In the absence of this prevalent geopolitical discourse, both the EU and
Turkey have spent the 1990s trying to locate themselves geographically. Drawing on
the literature on critical approaches to political geography and international relations,
this article seeks to answer the question of whether the EU’s post-Cold War security
discourse on the Mediterranean in general and on relations with Turkey in particular
point to a return to the earlier discourse of civilisational geopolitics. The article also
presents a reading of Turkish policy makers’ attempts to resist EU’s representation of
Turkey in ‘non-Europe’ (as with the ‘Middle East’ or the ‘Mediterranean’) as boundary-
producing practices which have served to underline the boundaries between the ‘West’
and the ‘non-West’. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave rise to
a feeling of ontological insecurity as to how to organise world politics when
drawing our mental maps. As John Agnew has argued, for a while there was a
‘current of nostalgia for the “good old days” when the East was East and the West
was West and never the twain should meet’.1 In the early 1990s this statement
seemed true for Turkish policy makers, who began to question Turkey’s identity
and its geopolitical location.2 The post-1989 environment was received rather
more favourably in the European Union,3 which increased its pace towards
‘becoming Europe’.4 This article analyses the changing geopolitical images of
Turkey and the European Union in the post-Cold War era. Drawing on the
literature on critical approaches to political geography5 and international relations,6
the article seeks to answer the question of whether the European Union’s post-
Cold War Mediterranean policy in general and its relations with Turkey in
particular point to a return to the discourse of civilisational geopolitics. 
Pinar Bilgin, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara 06533, Turkey.
E-mail: <pbilgin@bilkent.edu.tr>. 
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‘Civilisational geopolitics’ is one of the three discourses identified by John
Agnew in Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics, where he uses a threefold
periodisation to explain the development of geopolitical thought from the
early nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War.7 The discourse of
civilisational geopolitics is the one in which different parts of the world were
categorised in people’s mental maps according to the ‘civilisation’ to which
people that inhabited that ‘region’ were perceived to belong. Next came ‘natur-
alised geopolitics’ in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when
geopolitics as a separate discipline began to flourish. The third era Agnew
identifies is the ‘ideological geopolitics’ of the Cold War years, when the
world was divided in line with the ideological leanings of individual govern-
ments. With the end of the Cold War, the prevalence of the discourse of
ideological geopolitics has come to an end, thereby leaving a vacuum that is
yet to be occupied by a single geopolitical discourse.8 
So far, the European Union’s attempts to locate itself in post-Cold War
terrain of world politics have involved the re-inscription of a European identity
via foreign and security policies that involved the adoption of a two-pronged
policy of expanding towards the East whilst containing the South. Whereas
the prior involves the exporting of the EU’s own security-building model to
the East, the latter has entailed the EU’s almost single-handed construction of
a Mediterranean region via the Euro-Mediterranean partnership scheme. The
ambivalence in the EU policy makers’ approach to the issue of Turkey’s
membership, when coupled with the EU’s mid-1990s approach to Turkey
within a Mediterranean (i.e. Euro-Mediterranean partnership) framework, led
some in Turkey to wonder whether in the minds of EU policy makers the
boundaries of Europe were being drawn along civilisational lines.9 The per-
ception of Turkish policy makers was that Turkey was being judged by ‘different
criteria than other countries’ and that ‘the “Iron Curtain” that once divided
Europe was being replaced by a “cultural/religious iron curtain” ’.10 
This perception remains, notwithstanding the 1999 (Helsinki Summit)
decision of the European Union to recognise Turkey as a candidate country
and the 2002 (Copenhagen Summit) decision to declare December 2004 as
the date to review Turkey’s application and begin entry talks ‘without delay’,
provided that Turkey met the EU criteria.11 Indeed, the Copenhagen decision
divided Turkey’s public opinion into ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’. The policy
makers head the optimist camp, having declared the EU decision as Turkey’s
‘second best’ option and a minor victory.12 The pessimists, on the other hand,
have argued that the decision bore out the EU policy-makers’ ‘failure to
overcome their prejudices’ against Muslim Turkey,13 and that Turkey is
being ‘lulled into thinking that it will one day become an EU member’.14 
It is indeed possible to view the Helsinki and Copenhagen summit deci-
sions and the invitation extended to Turkey to participate in the convention on
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the future of the European Union as suggesting that the EU is open to the idea
of Turkey’s membership provided that Turkey fulfils the necessary require-
ments. Yet every time an EU policy maker makes an ambivalent statement it
is perceived (by the pessimists and optimists alike) as a challenge to Turkey’s
‘European vocation’ and evidence of EU prejudices against Muslim Turks.
(An example is Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s comment that ‘Turkey’s capital is
not in Europe . . . 95 per cent of its population is outside Europe, it is not a
European country’.15) What often goes unnoticed is the way in which
Turkey’s policy makers themselves resort to the discourse of civilisational
geopolitics in an attempt to locate themselves in Europe as opposed to the
Mediterranean or other non-Western geographical locale. Thus, whilst criti-
cising their EU counterparts for erecting walls between European and Islamic
or Western and non-Western peoples, Turkey’s policy makers, at times,
engage in similar ‘boundary-drawing practices’16 between ‘Turks’ and other
‘Islamic’ and/or ‘non-European’ peoples.17 
In search for an answer to the question of whether the discourse of civilisa-
tional geopolitics is likely to prevail in the post-Cold War era, this article will
limit itself to Turkey–EU relations and their respective policies towards the
Mediterranean. The article falls into two parts. The first part will look at the
European Union’s construction of the Mediterranean as a region and ask
whether the EU’s post-Cold War policies could be viewed as a return to the
discourse of civilisational geopolitics. In the second part, Turkish policy mak-
ers’ reactions to these developments will be analysed within the context of
their efforts to locate Turkey geographically in the post-Cold War map of
world politics. The concluding part will cast doubt upon the potential for the
adoption of an alternative security discourse by the European Union and
Turkey in the post-11 September era. 
The European Union and the ‘Mediterranean’ 
The EU’s Two-Pronged Approach to Security Building in its Peripheries 
During the 1990s, the European Union adopted a twofold approach to help
build security in its peripheries. To help maintain security in the southern
periphery, EU policy makers initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP) scheme in an attempt to encourage inter-state cooperation and
increase regional interdependence as a means of maintaining stability in the
Mediterranean. To maintain security in the eastern periphery the EU has
sought to export its own security-building model to many former Warsaw
Pact members as well as Malta and Cyprus (and Turkey since December
1999). The EU’s own security-building model is different from security
understood and practised as territorial defence (be it the defence of national
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borders or bloc boundaries, as with NATO during the Cold War). The project
of European integration itself has served as a security policy through which
member states were bound in a ‘network of interdependence which made
recourse to military means of resolving disputes progressively more diffi-
cult’.18 Viewed as such, the widening of the European Union to take in new
members has meant the EU’s exporting of its own security-building model to
its eastern periphery. The following analysis of the EU’s differentiated
approach to security building in its eastern and southern peripheries substan-
tiates the argument that in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the
European Union sought to re-inscribe a European identity partly by inventing
a Mediterranean other. Indeed, in the EU discourse the former Warsaw Pact
countries are presented as ‘returning to Europe’19 – Europe being a ‘zone of
peace’ – whereas the Mediterranean is presented as a ‘zone of conflict’ – an
area that should be contained. 
The Making of the Mediterranean 
Mediterranean littoral peoples and societies were conceived as constituting
parts of a total called the ‘Mediterranean’ in ancient Greece. According to
Thierry Hentch, the first uses of the concept ‘West’ referred to peoples, societ-
ies and states surrounding the Mediterranean, whereas lands further to the east
and south constituted the ‘East’.20 Following the Muslim conquest/invasion of
the territories to the south of the Mediterranean (as well as Asia Minor, Malta
and Spain) and the gradual emergence of the idea of ‘Europe’, the construct
referred to as the West shifted further westwards and those peoples, societies
and states located to the south of the Mediterranean Sea came to be included
in the (now vast) entity called the East.21 The solidification of the idea of
Europe took place during the era of civilisational geopolitics although Europe
as a continent predates this period.22 Following the ‘discovery’ of other contin-
ents and the encounter with their native peoples, the idea of Europeanness was
further reinforced. As Jacques Attali argued in 1492, the discovery of the
‘American continent’ made a significant impact on the development of a
European consciousness.23 
Even after the dissolution of the unity of the Mediterranean the ties that
bound Mediterranean peoples and societies remained, as evidenced in the
works of Fernand Braudel, who provided exceptional accounts of the economic
and cultural history of the Mediterranean world.24 A belief in the cultural unity
of the Mediterranean survived after these economic links grew weaker during
the Age of Discovery and especially after the decline of the Silk Road as the
route to the East. Indeed, as Paul Salem has maintained, among the Mediterranean
littoral countries of the Arab world, Egypt and Lebanon remained more in
touch with the Mediterranean dimension of their identity than others.25 For
instance, during the 1950s, some Lebanese nationalist thinkers voiced arguments
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favouring identification with the Mediterranean. During this period, Lebanese
intellectuals considered the Mediterranean identity as a tool for de-emphasising
their links with the Arab-Islamic world whilst claiming affinity with Europe
and the West.26 In Egypt, following independence, many Western educated
and/or oriented individuals advocated playing up Egypt’s Mediterranean
identity as it was perceived to be ‘neither completely European or Western nor
completely divorced from the Arab-Islamic world’.27 The Mediterranean
dimension of Egyptian identity was played down in the post-Second World
War era when it joined the League of Arab States and participated in the Arab
force constituted to fight Israel in 1948. Following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s
coming to power in 1954, debates about the Mediterranean dimension of
Egypt’s identity died down, only to be revived after his death.28 
As Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco gained independence there emerged
more non-European Mediterranean littoral states, thereby enabling Egyptian
intellectuals to put forward their arguments in a more confident manner. North
African intellectuals have also favoured identification with the Mediterranean
as a way of reinforcing the distinctiveness of the Maghreb’s Arab–Berber
ethnic mix and underlining historical links with Europe in general and France
in particular.29 In other words, ‘Mediterranean’, as an alternative spatial
representation, was used by the Maghreb intellectuals as a means of inscribing
their identity in distinction to a Mashreq other. 
The EU’s Mediterranean Policies 
Notwithstanding these early origins, it was the European Union that almost
single-handedly sought to (re)construct the Mediterranean as a region in the
last quarter of the twentieth century. Aforementioned accounts of the past
unity of the Mediterranean served as myths that bolstered EU policy-makers’
efforts to construct a security zone that includes Europe and the geograph-
ically closer North African states. 
It is worth noting that the argument here takes the mutually constitutive
relationship between foreign and security policy discourses and geographical
representations as its starting point,30 the assumption being that regions are
geopolitical representations that are constructed to aid in thinking about and
organising economic and security relations in different parts of the world. Be
it an external actor constructing a region to serve its strategic interests (as with
the United States ‘constructing’ the ‘Middle East’)31 or local actors engaging in
region building (as in Western Europe) ‘regions are imagined communities’.32 
In view of that, the conference at which an earlier version of this article
was presented (‘Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting’)
could also be considered as part of an attempt to re-inscribe the Mediterranean
as a region and ‘disseminate this imagination to as many other people as
possible’ – especially to those who act as opinion-formers in their countries.
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What follows is an analysis of the European Union’s 1990s attempt to
construct a ‘Mediterranean’ region—via the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP) process. 
The EU’s interest in the ‘Mediterranean’ began to evolve in line with a
change in its conceptions and practices of security during the 1970s. The
so-called Euro–Arab dialogue was first established after the 1973 Arab–Israeli
war and OPEC oil embargo. Although a number of cooperative schemes such
as the European Union’s Overall Mediterranean Policy of setting up bilateral
agreements with sub-regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) were initiated during
this period, Euro–Arab relations did not proceed any further, partly because of
the mistrust caused by some European states’ colonialist background and
partly due to the bipolar template imposed onto regional security dynamics.33 
The strengthening of the European Union and the slow progress towards a
common foreign and security policy, as well as the end of the Cold War
(which gave the EU a freer hand vis-à-vis the United States), were major
factors that enabled the European Union to move towards a policy relatively
independent of the United States and more in concert with its own domestic
security concerns.34 What was perhaps more significant was the context
created by the change in the societies of EU member states due to the growth
of Middle Eastern diasporas in Western Europe. 
The mid-1980s saw the increase in political violence by clandestine
organizations on European soil. This, in conjunction with the Iranian
revolution and the Middle East situation, served to reinforce this climate of
anxiety and turn the focus not towards all immigrants, but on those coming
from Islamic countries swept up in the wave of re-Islamization, or countries
in the middle of civil war. Islam, especially when it reached the Maghreb,
was seen as a direct threat not only for these countries but for Europe too.35 
This has led EU policy makers to re-think their priorities and come to consider
stability in the Middle East (especially the geographically closer North Africa)
as an integral part of ‘security in Europe’.36 Accordingly, EU policy makers
have sought to create cooperative schemes with the Mediterranean-rim
countries of the Middle East (that is, those areas that are ‘closer to home’) to
encourage and support economic development and growth. The expectation
has been that this would help reduce refugee flows from the Middle East to
Western Europe and prevent regional conflicts being exported to the EU. 
EU’s Mediterranean Policies as ‘Boundary-Producing Practices’ 
It has so far been argued that the Mediterranean has been (re)constructed by the
European Union in the post-Cold War era to help maintain security in Europe.
When EU security intellectuals speak of security in the Mediterranean, the
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referent for security is not necessarily the Mediterranean but Europe. The
Euro-Mediterranean project, in this sense, has been instrumental in following
a policy of containment by the European Union. 
What is meant by containment here is not the conventional understanding
of this practice (as in US containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold
War). On the contrary, EU policy makers are of the conviction that ‘economic,
political and diplomatic engagement’ with their Mediterranean counterparts
would be of ‘greater relevance’37 than resorting to Cold War-style contain-
ment policies of isolation (as with US ‘dual containment’ policy towards Iran
and Iraq). This is reflective of a broader conception of security (inclusive of
its non-military as well as military dimensions) that is at the root of the
European Union’s policies. As François Heisbourg has noted: 
Although the Europeans are just as prone – and possibly even more so,
for reasons of proximity – as the Americans to emphasise combined
regional dangers of militant fundamentalism and terrorism (not least in
Algeria, a prime French security concern), they do not usually see these
as essentially military challenges.38 
For, when the problem at hand is necessarily an economic and social one, the
military instrument might not be the best means to use. Since a major concern
of EU policy makers is maintaining domestic security within the European
Union especially in the face of rising xenophobia, they feel the need to resort
to economic and political (as opposed to purely military) instruments. Yet this
policy could nevertheless be characterised as one of containment in that,
through cooperation and dialogue, the European Union is aiming to help to
solve (or at least freeze) some Mediterranean problems so that these problems
would not threaten security in Europe directly (through military or terrorist
threats) or indirectly (through increasing migration and/or restlessness within
the Mediterranean diaspora in the Union). 
Second, by way of (re)constructing the Mediterranean, the European Union
has sought to re-inscribe a European identity via foreign and security policy
making.39 Following David Campbell’s re-theorisation of foreign policy
as ‘boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction
of the identity in whose name is operates’40, it could be argued that the
European Union’s foreign policy towards its southern neighbours (i.e. the
Euro-Mediterranean partnership scheme) has served to make the latter foreign. 
Indeed, the European Union’s differentiated approach to security in the
eastern and southern peripheries that characterised the 1990s could be inter-
preted as pointing to a shift in the EU discourse towards civilisational geopol-
itics. In the EU discourse, when the issue of the membership of the former
Warsaw Pact countries is discussed, they are presented as ‘returning to
Europe’, whereas Morocco’s application for membership (1986) was rejected in
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no uncertain terms (without extending any alternative offers). Iver Neumann
contrasts the rejection of Morroco’s candidacy by the European Union with
the integration of the German Democratic Republic. He finds it striking that
the latter decision did not go through a process of referendum or even the
approval of EU member states. Such practices of the European Union have
not only helped to shape European identity by identifying who is or is not
European, as Neumann emphasises,41 but also hinted at a return to civilisa-
tional geopolitics. 
A similar language of cultural symbols was used by some EU policy
makers in discussing Turkey’s application for membership during the 1990s.
For example, Wilfred Martens, a prominent German Christian Democrat,
pronounced in 1997 that ‘the EU is in the process of building a civilisation in
which Turkey has no place’.42 More recently, the German conservative party
CSU (Christian-Social Union of Bavaria) declared that ‘the accession of a
country that does not share the same religious or dominant values as the EU is
“unimaginable” ’.43 Although many prominent EU politicians distanced them-
selves from such remarks, some others chose not to. In the run up to the
Copenhagen Summit, the opposition CDU–CSU coalition warned the govern-
ment against giving ‘false hopes’ to Turkey at Copenhagen. Reporting on the
developments, the EUobserver commented that ‘even the moderate Christian
Democrats, too embarrassed to use the “religious” argument, are referring to
Turkey’s backward economy’.44 In the latter half of the 1990s, when Turkey’s
membership was not on the horizon, the sceptics wondered aloud as to 
whether a semi-developed Islamic country could in fact be regarded as
European – the boundaries to the New Europe had to be set somewhere,
after all – and also whether post-Cold War Turkey’s strategic signifi-
cance was now so compelling.45 
This was indeed what Turkish policy makers, as well as others in Turkey, asked
themselves during the 1990s. What follows is an analysis of geopolitical
imaginations of various actors in Turkey as reflected in their reactions to EU
policies during the 1990s.46 The article will turn in the conclusion to look at
Turkey–EU relations in the post-Helsinki era. 
Turkey between Europe and the Mediterranean 
The 1990s turned out to be a period of ‘ontological insecurity’ for Turkish
policy makers who questioned Turkey’s identity and its geographical loca-
tion.47 This ambivalence is rooted in a discrepancy between Turkish policy
makers’ ‘preferred geopolitical location’ for Turkey (Turkey in Europe) and
the ‘position accorded to Turkey’ in EU policy makers’ discourse (Turkey in
‘non-Europe’, such as the Mediterranean or the Middle East). As David
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Newman has argued, ‘the fact that the position accorded the state does not
necessarily coincide with the preferred geopolitical location of the state,
as reflected in its geopolitical imagination(s), may often be the cause for
conflict and tension within the global system’.48 The discrepancy between
Turkish policy makers’ ‘preferred geopolitical location’ and the one accorded
to Turkey by their EU counterparts became a source of contention between the
European Union and Turkey during the 1990s.49 Indeed, the European
Union’s ambivalence regarding the issue of Turkey’s membership was viewed
by some in Turkey as a rejection of Turkey’s ‘civilisational commitment’ to
the West – a commitment that has its roots in Kemal Atatürk’s foreign and
domestic policies.50 
Turkey’s ‘European Ideal’ 
The strained dialogue on Turkey’s geopolitical image and identity that charac-
terised the 1990s was not new but could be traced back to the debates on the
identity of the Ottoman Empire. For, while the Ottoman Empire could be
considered a European state, at the same time it was not. When considering
the place of the Ottoman Turks within an expanding international society,
Thomas Naff concluded that ‘even though a significant portion of the Empire
was based in Europe, it could not be said to have been of Europe’.51 John
Agnew concurs: In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century the ‘other-
ness of Turks’ had served as a ‘fundamental barrier to their participation in a
civilisational geopolitics that drew hard lines around its European home-
land’.52 Having said that, even during those times when the Ottomans were
represented as ‘Europe’s significant (constitutive) other, they nevertheless
were the ‘sick man of Europe’ and not Asia.53 
Viewed from the inside, the ambivalence regarding Turkey’s geopolitical
location and civilisational identity was a topic for intense debates between the
‘Westernisers’, ‘Islamists’ and ‘Turkists’ during the later years of the Ottoman
Empire. With the founding of the republic in 1923, this debate was resolved in
favour of Westernisation in that Turkish policy makers’ vocation has been one
of locating Turkey firmly in the West.54 In Atatürk’s lifetime, this vocation
manifested itself in domestic reforms whilst a strictly ‘realistic’ policy of
minimum  involvement in disputes was pursued in the external realm. Realistic
as it was, Kemalist foreign policy sought after one ‘ideal’: making Turkey a full-
fledged member of the community of Western European states on an equal basis.55 
Following Atatürk’s death in 1938, a policy of minimum involvement in
international disputes no longer seemed feasible given the international envir-
onment. Accordingly, during and in the aftermath of the Second World War
Turkish policy makers sought to establish alliances with European powers.
The Cold War and the prevalence of ideological geopolitics helped Turkish
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policy makers in this task. As the Cold War geopolitical imagination was
centred around two alternative models of political–economic organisation, the
East and the West, Turkey located itself in the West by virtue of its pro-
Western orientation and membership of European institutions. 
In this context, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) was viewed by Turkish policy makers as not only ending Turkey’s
anxieties caused by the Soviet Union’s post-war demands (on its eastern pro-
vinces and the control of the straits) but also bringing Turkey into the European
security system as a ‘fully recognised European state’.56 Metin Tamkoç’s
comment that NATO membership ‘secured formal acceptance of Turkey into
what was then known as the “Western-Christian-Democratic family of
European nations” which hitherto had kept the door shut to the Muslim Turks
of the Middle East’57 captures well this idealist dimension to Turkish foreign
policy. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, becoming
a NATO member emblemised the ideal of belonging to the community of
Western European states.58 
The roles Turkey played in European institutions have served as
occasions on which Turkish policy makers articulated and defined Turkey’s
Western and/or European identity as well as maintaining its security needs
and interests. During the Cold War, Turkish policy makers were enthusiastic
participants in European institutions, membership in which was viewed as
evidence of Turkey’s claim to belong to the Western civilisation. Writing
in 1977, Ismail Soysal, then Turkey’s ambassador to Buenos Aires, main-
tained that ‘the Turkish nation’s Islamic creed cannot bar Turkey from taking
its place within the community of nations who adhere to Western civilisation
provided that it adequately conforms to the requirements of that civilisation’.59 
Soysal’s words that located Turkey firmly in the West could also be
viewed as an instance of Turkish foreign policy making as a boundary-
producing practice, for they served to (re)inscribe the boundary between
Western and Islamic civilisations. Turkish policy makers were adamant in
their choice of location for Turkey in the West, notwithstanding the pull of
their Islamic creed toward non-West. Similarly, nowadays, when Turkish
policy makers react to their EU counterparts’ perceived unwillingness to
allow Turkey into the European Union, they simultaneously signal their own
unwillingness to see Turkey located in a non-Western geographical locale –
such as the Mediterranean or the Middle East. 
Soysal’s message was also intended for domestic consumption. He was
reminding a domestic audience of the need to conform to the standards of the
Western civilisation. Soysal wrote: 
The more advanced and more lasting influence of Western civilisation
on Turkish foreign policy has been the European Economic Community
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which is composed of nations that share the same system of values and
that strive for eventual full political integration. Since 1963 when
Turkey signed its Treaty of Association with the European Community
Turkey has begun a new period of ‘harmony of civilisations’. In the
future if we are sincere in our association and our full membership we
should have no qualms about Western civilisation and democratic order.
We believe this is a way of no return for Turkey.60 
Other authors voiced similar views on Turkey’s geographical location, and the
relationship between that location, Turkey’s civilisational identity and domes-
tic politics in an attempt to evoke and realise a domestic self that was
‘European’: 
While some countries which were geographically situated in Europe
could not be admitted to the membership of the Council of Europe or
were later dismissed from it because they did not have a democratic
system Turkey has been able to maintain its place. Turkey is considered
European because it believes in the democratic system of government,
implements it earnestly and keeps its pace with the contemporary civil-
isation. As the only Islamic European country, it will keep its European
identity so long as it fulfils the requirements of our present civilisation.61 
In time, as the European Coal and Steel Community broadened its span and
activities to transform itself into the European Community/European Union,
joining the EU became the new ideal. 
When the Cold War ended, those who sincerely believed in the EC/EU
route being a ‘way of no return’ for Turkey were faced with a major problem.
As the European Union sought to relocate itself in the evolving map of world
politics, Turkish policy-makers discovered to their dismay that the place
accorded to Turkey might not fall within the boundaries of ‘new Europe’.
Thus, in the absence of the (communist) ‘East’—the ‘other’ against which
Turkey substantiated its claim to membership of the ‘West’ and/or ‘Europe’—
the long-standing discrepancy between Turkish policy-makers’ preferred
geopolitical location and that accorded by their European counterparts forced
itself unto the post-Cold War agenda of Turkish policy-makers. During the
1990s, as the Westernising elite’s ‘hand’ was weakened as a result of the
ambivalent attitude of their EU counterparts, the debate on Turkey’s geopolit-
ical location and identity was re-opened. 
Accordingly, EU policy makers’ aforementioned scepticism regarding
Turkey’s place in the European Union has been viewed by many in Turkey as a
challenge to its Western and/or European identity. In the immediate aftermath
of the declaration of Agenda 2000,63 which did not put Turkey on the list of
candidate countries, many in Turkey felt betrayed by their EU counterparts.
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This feeling of betrayal is captured nowhere better than the website of the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which seeks to remind readers that ‘hav-
ing played an active role in the demise of the Soviet bloc, it was only natural
for Turkey to aspire for inclusion in the new European architecture which it
helped to build’.64 In response to this perceived betrayal of their EU counter-
parts,65 Turkey’s policy makers sought to play the security card, which had
previously secured Turkey’s membership in many European institutions
during the Cold War. What seemed to have escaped Turkey’s policy makers
was the extent to which the European Union’s conception and practices of
security were transformed throughout the years and that Turkey and its EU
counterparts grew increasingly apart from each other. During the Cold War,
the European Union made use of the security umbrella provided by NATO
and adopted a unique approach to security building by putting a broader range
of issues on the agenda (such as economic, environmental and human rights
issues) without labelling them as security issues. This enabled EU policy
makers to find a common ground in the solution of a broad range of problems
without getting entangled in East–West confrontation. 
The differences between Turkey and the European Union are not limited to
the stress put by EU policy makers on the non-military dimensions of security
and the use of non-military instruments such as soft governance and common
security practices. Perhaps more significantly, this unique approach to security
building in the European Union began to constitute its own insecurities in the
form of soft security threats after the end of the Cold War. This has meant
the labelling of a range of issues (such as South–North migration and drug
trafficking) as security problems and the launch of projects such as the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership. Eventually, the issue of Turkey’s membership
became more of a challenge for the European Union. In the post-Cold War
context where threats to security are perceived to take the form of soft security
threats, Turkey’s massive population emerges as one of the sources of this prob-
lem. As will be argued below, there is as yet little awareness among Turkey’s
policy makers that this transformation in the security conceptualisation and
practice of the EU may mean that security relations may not serve as the strong-
est of ties that bind Turkey to Europe, so long as this gap in security thinking
and practices is not bridged.66 
Turkey’s ‘Security Card’ 
Even though some among the Turkish policy making elite may have had their
doubts regarding Turkey’s place in Europe in terms of civilisational identity, a
significant part of their claim to belong to Europe rested on the role Turkey
played in the European security architecture during the Cold War. In the latter
half of the 1990s, as the European Union sought to develop its Common
European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), Turkish policy makers
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found Turkey being increasingly excluded from the EU’s evolving security
policies. This feeling of betrayal was coupled with a sense of shock when the
aforementioned challenge to Turkey’s Europeanness was extended to the
realm of security. General Çevik Bir, then deputy chief of Turkish General
Staff, gave voice to Turkish policy makers’ concerns when he said: ‘Even as
the importance of collective defence and the transatlantic link are being
emphasised within NATO, simultaneously contradictory arguments are also
being advanced, which can only be described as “Europe is for the Euro-
peans”.’67 This seemingly growing gap between the security perceptions and
policies of Turkey and the European Union is viewed by some Turkish
observers as ‘paradoxical’ in that 
although Turkey fully participates in the European Security Architec-
ture, even here it encounters problems because it is excluded from the
EU’s evolving defence arm – CESDP (Common European Security and
Defence Policy) – which is part of this architecture. This is an interest-
ing point because security was one of the strong links tying Turkey to
Europe and vice versa.68 
Yet what is often forgotten is that Turkish policy makers and their European
counterparts do not see eye to eye when they discuss issues of security in
Europe. As noted above, they conceive security differently.69 
Turkey participated in the maintenance of security in Europe during the
Cold War by virtue of its strategically significant geographical location, the
size of its army and the pro-Western orientation of the Turkish regime that
helped bolster the identity of the West.70 However, as the Soviet threat to
Eastern Europe lost its imminence, and the European Community trans-
formed itself to a ‘security community’71 Turkey’s contribution to security
building in Europe became less significant in the eyes of EU policy makers.
Although the aforementioned gap between the security perceptions and inter-
ests of Turkey and its Western European allies were kept under the lid until the
late 1980s, the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) brought it out into the open. 
Over the years, the European Union focused on managing non-military
dimensions of security whereas NATO – where Turkey played its role – took
care of the military dimension. With the end of the Cold War and the decline
in the significance of NATO for security building in Western Europe,
Turkey’s significance also seemed to decline. For, when viewed from an EU
perspective, Turkey’s location in a ‘rough neighbourhood’72 – what Turkish
policy makers represent as a significant asset – might become a source of
instability (i.e. burden). Furthermore, during the Cold War, the European Union
adopted a comprehensive conception of security and increasingly relied on
non-military instruments whereas Turkey, still surrounded by conventional threats
to its security, hesitated to make similar changes in its thinking and practices. 
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The persistence of this gap despite the European Union’s increasing
interest in military dimensions of security73 was viewed as surprising by some
in Turkey who expected a closer EU–Turkey relationship to evolve now that
the EU seemed to need Turkey’s military goods for crisis management purposes.
Such arguments are based on the understanding that the European Union is on
its way to become a military power as opposed to the civilian power it was
during the Cold War years. Accordingly, observers in Turkey expect that the
normalisation of the European Union would result in enhanced EU interest in
Turkey’s strategic geopolitical location. General Bir, for one, believes that
‘the new risks and challenges that could affect the whole Western world have
transformed Turkey from a “flank” to a “front state”. Turkey is one of the few
Western countries whose importance has increased in the post-Cold War
period.’74 Minister of Defence Hikmet Sami Türk concurs: 
Geographic destiny placed Turkey in the virtual epicentre of a
‘Bermuda Triangle’ of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty, with
the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East encircling us. Rather
than isolating ourselves from the pressing conflicts at our doorstep,
Turkey decided to assume a pivotal role in promoting regional peace,
stability and cooperation in contributing to vital efforts to end human
suffering and conflict.75 
What Turkish policy makers often seem to forget is the persistence of the
aforementioned discrepancy between their preferred geopolitical location for
Turkey and that of their EU counterparts and, equally significantly, the
differences between their approaches to security. The latter is likely to become
a contentious issue as Turkey moves further along on the path to EU member-
ship. In the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit, EU policy makers put the
issue of the ‘definitive separation of civil and military competencies in
exercising power’ on the agenda of EU-Turkey relations.76 The privileged
position traditionally accorded to the military in Turkey77 in the making of for-
eign and security policies could become a bone of contention in Turkey–EU
relations in the near future. Space does not permit further discussion of Turkey–
EU security relations and the role of the military in foreign and security policy-
making.78 Suffice it to note here that during the 1990s, Turkey not only failed
to adopt broad conceptions of security, but it also experienced a securitisation of
its foreign policy whereby certain issues were pulled out of the realm of open
debate and discussion by way of declaring them as national security issues.79 
(Re)locating Turkey—‘Not in the Mediterranean!’ 
In reaction to this perceived betrayal of their EU counterparts, Turkish policy
makers sought to de-emphasise Turkey’s European identity and re-locate
Turkey in the Black Sea, and Central Asia (the so-called ‘Turkic world’).
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Hence the aforementioned struggle for (re)locating Turkey in the post-Cold
War geographical terrain of world politics. A discussion of Turkey’s many
geographical positions and identities is beyond the confines of this article.
Suffice it to note here that the diversity in Turkey’s geopolitical imagining and
positioning that was already apparent during the Cold War became only more
apparent in its wake. Traditionally, this diversity has been presented as an
asset by Turkey’s policy makers. The website of the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs describes Turkey’s geographical position as follows: 
[Turkey] lies at the ‘crossroads’ where two continents, Europe and Asia,
meet, and also where cultures and civilisations come together. This
unique position gives her European, Balkan, Mediterranean, Middle
Eastern, Caucasian and Asian identities all at the same time.80 
A retired general of the Turkish armed forces (who is also the author of many
books on Turkey’s geopolitics)81 describes Turkey’s location in more stark terms: 
Turkey constitutes the hinge of the world island that is made up of three
continents. It is both the lock and the key to this hinge. It connects the
Mediterranean and the Black Sea . . . It brings together and keeps apart
the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East.82 
This sense of being at the crossroads of two (or three) continents has had
diverse implications for Turkey’s foreign and security policies as viewed in
the discourses of Turkey’s policy makers. Turkey’s geographical position is
presented as offering unique opportunities (such as the potential to play the
role of a bridge between different civilisations) whilst constituting unique vul-
nerabilities (such as claims on Turkey’s resources and territory, heterogeneous
population make-up, and historical disputes with neighbouring countries
which have diverse strategic cultures). What seems common to all such repre-
sentations is the emphasis put on the diversity in Turkey’s geopolitical posi-
tioning as reinforcing Turkey’s claim to a European identity: ‘Turkey is not
searching for alternatives to Europe. Our European policies have always been
complementary to the other dimensions of our foreign policy and vice versa’,
maintained Özdem Sanberk, then Turkey’s ambassador to London.83 
Ole Wæver has insight into the reason why Turkish policy makers are so
wary of over-emphasising the non-European dimensions of Turkey’s identity.
The reason, argues Waever, is that ‘in accordance with traditional European
prejudices, the more Turkey is seen to turn towards the East, the less it will be
deemed “European” ’.84 Indeed, over the years, Turkey sought to use the
BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) initiative and its links with Central
Asian countries to increase its value regarding the economic ambitions and
security concerns of the European Union and not as an alternative to EU
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membership. In other words, such alternative geopolitical images were almost
always used to bolster Turkey’s geopolitical location in Europe by enhancing
its value for EU (or US) interests in the aforementioned regions. There is also
some evidence that the United States and to a lesser extent the European
Union are interested in investing in Turkey’s future as Central Asia’s ‘gate-
way to the West’.85 
During this period, the Mediterranean dimension of Turkey’s identity was
remarkable for its absence from the discussions on geopolitical identities of
Turkey. In the eyes of Turkish policy makers, it is viewed as acceptable to
locate Turkey in the Mediterranean so long as this representation is considered
alongside Turkey’s other geopolitical locations including Europe, the Middle
East, the Black Sea and the Turkic World. See, for instance, the following excerpt
from an article by an official of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Turkey’s international role, in the current stage of world developments, may
be defined as the sum of the parts she plays in the multiple context of the
evolving equation in Europe, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the
Black Sea and Transcaucasus regions, as well as the Trans Caspian area.86 
What is interesting is that even when the Mediterranean is mentioned, it is not
conceived as a totality (as it is by the European Union). It is the Eastern
Mediterranean that is referred to: the part of the Mediterranean that NATO is
interested in and where Turkey has a clearly defined role as part of a European
security organisation. When the Mediterranean is presented as an alternative
to Europe, Turkish policy makers do not wish to see Turkey located in the
Mediterranean. The EU policy makers’ aforementioned construction of the
Mediterranean as non-Europe has certainly not helped in alleviating the fears
of Turkish policy makers who think that Turkey is offered a place in EMP as
an alternative to joining the European Union, and that it is being located
geographically in the peripheries and not in Europe. 
Notwithstanding Turkish policy makers’ misgiving regarding the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership scheme, Turkey did participate in the negotiations
and sign under the Barcelona treaty – but only as a reluctant partner. Indeed,
when compared with their enthusiasm regarding the BSEC project, Turkish
policy-makers’ interest in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership scheme has
been rather dim.87 An official of the European Commission in Turkey even
felt the need to reassure Turkey’s policy makers that ‘active participation
in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership does not mean stepping out of the
process of full membership to the European Union. Turkey should overcome
its scepticism and take part in the process of economic integration of the
Mediterranean’.88 
Although it is possible to interpret the Turkish policy makers’ stance
toward the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership scheme as one of ‘indifference’89
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the argument here is that their attitude could be labelled as anything but indif-
ference. Indifference implies a passive stance; it involves a lack of interest.
However, Turkish policy makers have been active in their promotion of
Turkey’s other identities (in particular that of BSEC and the Turkic World)
but not that of the Mediterranean. Thus, Turkish policy makers are wary of
providing substance to EU policy makers’ efforts to locate Turkey in the
Mediterranean. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the Turkish foreign policy elite
have resented the European Union’s categorisation of Turkey with other non-
EU Mediterranean countries. Resentment is more active an attitude than
indifference – the former involves bitterness and even anger. Turkish policy
makers’ perception is that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership scheme
‘reduces the status of Turkey in the EU into a neighbouring country’,90 and
that Turkey cannot be put in the same ‘Mediterranean’ basket as with the
Maghreb and Mashreq countries that do not aspire to join the European
Union. Accordingly, it could be argued that Turkish policy makers view the
Mediterranean from the lens of Turkey’s European vocation. Thus, they
resent being invited to sit at the other side of the table together with other
non-EU Mediterranean countries.91 Turkish policy makers also consider the
European Union’s mid-1990s attempts to transfer funds to Turkey through the
EMP (funds that are held up by the Greek veto) not as a goodwill gesture, but
as ‘political behaviour that proves the EU’s exclusionary policy toward
Turkey’.92 Such policy, in turn, is symptomatic of a lack of self-reflection on
the part of Turkey’s policy makers.Whilst criticising their EU counterparts for
erecting walls between Turkey and Europe, their own foreign policy discourse
on the issue of Euro-Mediterranean partnership has served as a boundary-
producing practice in that, in seeking to locate Turkey in Europe, they dis-
tanced themselves from the Mediterranean. This, in turn, is not promising in
terms of Turkey’s claim to contribute to harmony between civilisations as a
future member of the EU. 
Conclusion 
Turkey–EU relations have been far from unchanging in the way the logic of a
discourse based on civilisational differences would imply. The European
Union’s 1999 decision to recognise Turkey as a candidate country in itself
could be viewed as negating the argument that ‘the Muslim world, including
Turkey, is appearing once again as the counterpart to Europe, as its “relevant
other” ’.93 For, although the Turkish other has been significant in the making
of Europe, the other(s) of Europe has changed throughout history. 
Since the 1999 decision of the European Union to recognise Turkey’s can-
didacy, Turkey–EU relations have taken a different turn. The economic crisis
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of 2000 gave rise to a feeling of emergency, which enabled the pro-EU circles
in Turkey to push for not only financial-economic reforms (also demanded by
the IMF) but also political ones required by EU conditionality. During this
period Turkey’s constitution was amended. Of the 34 articles that have
recently been amended, 22 also coincide with the wishes of the European
Union. The most recent changes (made in the summer of 2002) include
improving human rights, strengthening the rule of law and restructuring of
democratic institutions.94 These are expected to be followed by complemen-
tary legislative and administrative measures to ensure their implementation.
Furthermore, at the Copenhagen Summit, the disagreements between Turkey
and its EU counterparts on the issue of European security and defence policy
were overcome. However, the issue of the discrepancies between the security
conceptions and practices of the EU remains. 
One question that still demands an answer is whether EU policy makers
are likely to succeed in avoiding a drift towards the civilisational geopolitics
that coloured their post-Cold War security discourse. As Barry Buzan and
Thomas Diez have argued, the talk about who is ‘wholly “in” or “not in” has
narrowed political visions in an unhealthy way, and runs counter to the EU’s
increasingly “postmodern” character’.95 Giscard d’Estaing’s intervention in
the EU debate on Turkey’s membership and the debate in Germany has shown
that an understanding of geography shaped by civilisational geopolitics con-
tinues to influence the discourse of some in the European Union.96 This, in turn,
might have repercussions for the European Union’s Mediterranean policy.
There already is an awareness of the broader impact EU–Turkey relations
could make on the rest of the Muslim world. Making the case for Turkey’s
membership, the Economist recently noted: 
An EU that is open to Turkey should send a message to the troubled
Muslim world of today: the West does not consider Islam and demo-
cracy incompatible as long as Islam doesn’t . . . Offering a provisional
date for the start of negotiations is an historic chance for Europe but also
for the Muslim world to show that their two great civilisations are not
fated always to clash.97 
Indeed, an improvement in Turkey–EU relations might enable the European
Union to present itself to its southern periphery as a truly multi-cultural entity
that is not anti-Muslim. Accordingly, it is possible to view the December 2004
date presented to Turkey at the Copenhagen summit as an attempt to give
Turkey a ‘strong signal’ (thereby avoiding alienating Turkey and the rest of the
Muslim world) while keeping the domestic opposition at bay. In the coming
years, the challenge for those working for Turkey’s membership would not
only be that of fulfilling the EU criteria but also that of overcoming the preju-
dices of those whose discourse on Turkey’s membership hint at a possible
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return of civilisational geopolitics. This would not be an easy task given the
ways in which Turkish foreign policy during the republican period was utilised
to help evoke and realise a domestic self that is European and Western – an
identity that was maintained against non-European and non-Western others.98 
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